M’Naughten Rule

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to delve into the history of the M’Naughten Rule, how it was used in the past, its present use and its use in the future. The paper states the relevancy and reliability of the topic. The paper also reviews the type of cases that it would be used in, the nature of cases it has been used in, and failures that it has produced.
History of M’Naughten Rule
Before the M’Naughten Rules came into existence, crimes committed under the influence of insanity weren’t punishable in most places. Since the ancient days, the laws in Ancient Hebrew stated that “idiots, lunatics, and children” cannot distinguish good actions from bad. However, many nations in the world didn’t deal with the insanity perspective in judgments until the M’Naughten Rules came into being.
The history of M’Naughten Rule dates back to 1843. The name “M’Naughten” was derived from a person’s name, Daniel M’Naughten. He was a woodturner of Scottish origin who tried to assassinate Robert Peel, the then British Prime Minister, on the belief that he had engineered his personal and financial woes. However, he mistook Edward Drummond, his secretary, for him and killed him on his stead (Richard, 2009). Before the attempted assassination on the British PM, M’Naughten had confided to various people among them his father and the Glasgow Police Commissioner that the Tories were harassing him and spying on him, though, his complains fell on deaf ears. Upon appearing before a magistrate after the assassination attempt, M’Naughten defended himself saying that the evidence was conclusive that the Tories destroyed his peace of mind. On his trial, nine witnesses made testimonies that he was insane. Much to the public chagrin, the judgment on M’Naughten case claimed that because he was insane when he did the act, he was not guilty.
The public outcry due to the judgment compelled the House of Lords to defend the grounds of insanity by adapting various principles referred to as the M’Naughten Rule. It states that from a legal perspective, the defendant is insane if he or she is unable to perceive a right or wrong act when he committed the crime that he allegedly did.

Use of M’Naughten Rule in the past
Many American courts have used the M’Naughten Rule in its original form for over a century until the rule was modified in the mid-twentieth century. Upon modification, there has been the inclusion of a provision for the defendant who commits an act under “an irresistible impulse” which doesn’t prevent the person from an offense that he or she knows is wrong.

Cases where M’Naughten Rule has been or can be used
R v Kemp (1957) 1 QB 399. This case involved a husband of an otherwise good conduct, attacking his spouse, albeit with no motive. He was arraigned in court for his act. However, the husband was suffering from arteriosclerosis that made him temporarily unconsciousness. Thus, when he struck his spouse with the hammer, he was not conscious. Devlin J ruled that regardless of the cause of the person’s defect of mind, it doesn’t matter as the defendant had a “disease of the mind” which made him unable to depend on the automatism defense.
Due to the R v Quick & Paddison (1973) 3 AER 397 and the R v Hennessy (1989) 1 WLR 287 case, diabetes was included in the list of the “disease of the mind”. The defendant both stole and drove a car. Failure to take his insulin dose and stress made him suffer hyperglycemia which subsequently contributed to his non-insane automatism. The defendant who didn’t know stealing the car, defended himself on the basis of automatism but the judge ruled out that insanity was the relevant defense. In the R v Quick & Paddison (1973) 3 AER 397 case, the diabetic defendant was suffering from hypoglycemia when committed the offense due to taking alcohol, poor diet and the insulin that he had taken. The defendant’s plead was guilty, but, not guilty by reason of insanity. The fact that the trial judge never left the defendant a defense of automatism option, he wasn’t convicted.
The R v Sullivan (1984) AC 156 case contributed the inclusion of an epilepsy condition to the “disease of the mind.” Under epilepsy, a man kicked another man. The trial judge ruled out that the appropriate form of defense was on insanity and not automatism. In the list of “diseases of the mind”, unless under specified external reasons, sleepwalking was included as portrayed by the R v Burgess 1991 2 WLR 1206 case whereby sleepwalking made the defendant injure a woman by hitting her using a video recorder compelling the trial judge to make a verdict based on insanity.
It may be used on assumption of sanity and sufficient proof. Hereby, the proof held is that there is a higher possibility of mental disability than mental healthiness. On the Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963) AC 386 case; the defendant was a murder suspect and on his defense, pleaded insane and automatism which conformed to the fact that he suffered from psycho-motor epilepsy. The jury discredited the automatism plea on the basis that epilepsy is regarded as insanity in English law; convicted the defendant but the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords upheld the ruling. The act of a defendant describing his or her state of mind is sufficient to make the prosecution think of the defendant as insane, and the aforementioned case is a good example of the difference of the terms automatism and insanity.
The M’Naughten rule also apply to the persons who commit crimes with a cognitive knowledge that they are morally wrong but have mental illnesses as portrayed by the Windle 1952 2QB 826;1952 2 All ER 1 246 whereby the defendant murdered his spouse by giving her an aspirin overdose, informed the police and stated that he supposed that he would be “hang for this.” The other application is in a crime committed but unintentionally such as the DPP v Harper (1997) case whereby the defendant drove his Chevrolet over the speed limit because he was drunk despite the fact that he knew it was wrong driving while drunk. He was held insane because it applies to an mens rea offense. The defendant’s insanity was found as not qualifying for strict liability offenses.
Present use of the M’Naughten Rule
Many American states use the M’Naughten rule while others have modified the rule and thus use a slight variation. Over half of the states use the M’Naughten rule based on the Daniel M’Naughten landmark case. Columbia still makes use of the M’Naughten rule as a test for the defendant’s insanity. Many other American states use the M’Naughten rule in one form or another. Examples of such states and the stricture use of the M’Naughten rule or a slight variation follows. In Alabama, Washington, Pennsylvania, South and North Carolina, South Dakota, Oregon, Ohio, California, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Florida and New Jersey states, the M’Naughten rule is used, though, it is upon the defendant to provide proof of insanity.
In Alaska and Georgia, a slight modification is used and a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is recognized. Virginia, Texas, New Mexico and Colorado states uses both the M’Naughten rule together with the Irresistible Impulse Test. There are specific conditions stated by constitutions under which the “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict is effective. An example is The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 which requires a testimony from at least two medical practitioners who have been both registered and have experience in the mental disorders. If the defendant is found out to be insane, the jury are required to make a special verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity” as stated on the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883. Also, the jury is required to detain the insane persons accused as directed under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964.
Future uses of M’Naughten rule
There was a case that was almost similar to that of Daniel M’Naughten, the attempted assassin of the then U.S President, Ronald Reagan. The assassin was acquitted of the assassin attempt. John Hinckley Jr., compelled the U.S. Congress to introduce 26 legislation pieces. The Hinckley case showed that it was only one federal circuit that had adhered to the introduction of both the medical and psychiatric evidence standards by The American Law Institute (A.L.I.). The A.L.I standards coordinated the “right and wrong” rule based on the M’Naughten rule with with the “irresistible impulse” test which were effective in imposing more stricter standards of evidence to limit the occurrence of acquittals that resembled to Hinckley’s in the future.
Relevancy and Reliability
The M’Naughten Rule is relevant and irrelevant, reliable and unreliable, in equal measure. The insanity that M’Naughten argues about could be relevant or irrelevant to the criminal accountability. It has a number of the aforementioned under the following conditions. For the defendant’s case to succeed in a special verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity”, there must be lack of a cognitive state of mind. Contrary to the basis of M’Naughten’s insanity, the rules doesn’t put into the context the persons who despite the fact that they are insane, they nevertheless can distinguish a right act from a wrong one. The M’Naughten Rule doesn’t give a clear definition of the disease of the mind. The rule stresses much on the requirements of knowing. The rule is not precise on the method that one should use so as to categorize an act as wrong. It is not clear on how to handle the defendants who were compelled by their impulses to commit crimes but knew the crimes were punishable by law.
Approximately sixteen states use the M’Naughten Rule to find out whether the defendants were in a capacity to distinguish between the right and the wrong as a result of mental disorder. The M’Naughten Rule has been used to supplement the Irresistible Impulse Test (Samuel & Alexander, 2001). It has stood the test of almost two centuries, a conclusive proof of its strength and has garnered the support of both influential lawyers like Professors John B. Waite and Jerome Hall, and notable psychiatrists among them Dr. Fredric Wertham.

Failures it has produced
The U.S judiciary system adapted it in 1851, though, it was modified in the mid-twentieth century. It had been faulted for various insufficiencies. Some courts don’t use the M’Naughten rule in their rulings as some constitutions have faulted them in a number of ways as follows. The verdict made under the M’Naughten rule doesn’t conform with psychiatric knowledge, discourages full and thorough testimony, and that the psychiatric professional making the testimony testifies not scientifically, but as an ethical judge.
On the State v McLaughlin, 725 N.W. 2D 703 (Minn. 2007) case ruling, John McLaughlin,15, shot and killed two classmates in 2003 using a pistol. One victim, Mr. Bartell was the only intended victim because he kept on teasing and bullying McLaughlin. McLaughlin wanted just to hurt and not to kill. However, he accidentally killed a second victim in the same scene. The jury concluded that he had cognitive awareness that shooting persons was an immoral act. Thus, he was charged with first and second degree murders and sentenced a life imprisonment for Mr. Bartell’s death and 144 months due to Rollin’s death. In his appeal, McLaughlin, stated that despite his cognitive awareness that shooting was an immoral act; recent research on brain development shows that adolescents have irresistible impulses unlike adults, something that the M’Naughten rule doesn’t recognize (Reena & Charles, 2008). This resembled the Roper v. Simmons case where the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited cruel and unusual punishment of persons under the age of 18 as directed under the Eighth Amendment. This case raised the issue of insanity defense in adolescents.

References
Brakel, S.J. & Brooks, A.D. (2001). Law and psychiatry in the criminal justice system. NY: Wm. S. Hein Publishing.
Kapoor, R. & Dike, C.C. (2008). Adolescents and the Insanity Defense. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 36:1:145-147.
Schneider, R.D. (2009). Lunatic and the Lords, First Ed. Toronto, Canada: Irwin Law Inc.